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 Polity o Volume XXXV, Number 2 * Winter 2002
 Third-Party Voting in
 Gubernatorial Elections:
 A Study of Angus King of Maine
 and Jesse Ventura of Minnesota*
 Howard J. Gold
 Smith College
 This article analyzes the election of gubernatorial candidates Angus King of
 Maine (1994 and 1998) and Jesse Ventura of Minnesota (1998) in an attempt to
 determine the factors that produced these third-party victories. Previous studies
 point to a "culture of independence" explanation for third-party success. This
 approach focuses on attributes of the electorate, such as anti-partisan sentiment,
 previous support for a third-party candidate, economic discontent, issue con-
 cerns, and youth. Using VNS exit poll data and a multinomial logit model, I find
 that only two factors-anti-partisan sentiment and prior support for a third-party
 candidate-are powerful explanations for the success of both King and Ventura.
 The analysis suggests that the Minnesota case comes closer to the more familiar
 model of a third-party candidate who runs against the establishment and who
 mobilizes disaffected voters. There are, however, certain features of the electoral
 context-registration rules, money, candidate reputation and ideological pro-
 file-that bind these two cases and that also serve as powerful explanations for
 third-party success.
 Howard J. Gold is an Associate Professor of Government at Smith College. His
 research interests include partisanship and public opinion in the United States.
 Contact information: Department of Government, Smith College, Northampton,
 MA, 01063. Email: hgold@smith.edu.
 I. Introduction
 When Ross Perot won nearly 20 percent of the vote in the 1992 presidential
 election, many political observers saw in Perot the beginning of the end of the
 major parties' stranglehold on American politics. Perot won only 8 percent of the
 vote in 1996, but the 1992 and 1996 presidential elections marked the first pair of
 consecutive elections since 1856 and 1860 in which alternative candidates won
 *Thanks to Donald Baumer, Robert Buchele, Lois Joy, Howard Reiter, Ron Seyb, Nicholas Xenos, and
 the anonymous reviewers of Polity for helpful comments and advice.
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 266 THIRD-PARTY VOTING IN GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS
 more than 10 percent of the vote.' Recent third-party success has been noteworthy
 in sub-presidential elections as well. Two states, Alaska and Connecticut, elected
 third-party governors in 1990-Walter Hickel in Alaska and Lowell Weicker in Con-
 necticut. And two members of Congress were elected as independents, Bernard
 Sanders of Vermont (first elected in 1990) and Virgil Goode of Virginia (elected as
 an independent in 2000). Perhaps most striking were the recent successes of two
 alternative gubernatorial candidates, Angus King of Maine and Jesse Ventura or
 Minnesota. In 1994, independent candidate King captured 35 percent of the Maine
 vote to become the state's second independent governor in twenty years. Four
 years later, King coasted to re-election in a landslide, winning almost 60 percent of
 the vote. Also in 1998, former professional wrestler and Reform Party candidate
 Jesse Ventura captured 37 percent of the vote in a hotly contested Minnesota
 gubernatorial election.
 Studies of alternative candidate voting have identified a series of voter attributes
 that contribute to the success of these candidates. Some have suggested that low
 levels of partisan sentiment are a precondition of third-party success. Anti-partisan
 sentiment comes in a variety of shapes and forms. A high degree of independence
 among voters, low levels of satisfaction with the major parties or perceptions that
 there is little to distinguish Democrats from Republicans (predicated upon either
 incompetence or the parties' issue-positions): all of these have been variously cited
 as explanations for the success of third-party candidates.2 It is also suggested that
 young voters-youth representing weakened partisan attachments-are more sus-
 ceptible to the appeal of alternative candidates.3 Others have pointed to voters' dis-
 satisfaction with the individual candidates fielded by the major parties-it is said
 that alternative candidates fare well when voters are unusually dissatisfied with the
 major party candidates.4 Still others have looked to alienation from or cynicism
 toward government as a precondition of third-party success.5 When voters feel as if
 government is not acting in their interest, they are more likely to be receptive to the
 outsider appeal of an alternative candidate. Some work has suggested that eco-
 nomic discontent produces an environment favorable to alternative candidate suc-
 1. Rhodes Cook, "Voters Still Want More than Status Quo," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,
 December 21, 1996: 3474.
 2. See, for example, Steven J. Rosenstone, Roy L. Behr, and Edward H. Lazarus, Third Parties in Amer-
 ica: Citizen Response to Major Party Failure. Second Edition, Revised and Expanded (Princeton, NJ: Prince-
 ton University Press, 1996); Howard J. Gold, "Third Party Voting in Presidential Elections: A Study of Perot,
 Anderson, and Wallace," Pblitical Research Quarterly 48 (1995): 751-773; and Daniel A. Mazmanian, Third
 Parties in Presidential Elections (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1974).
 3. See, for example, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Jerrold G. Rusk, and Arthur C. Wolfe, "Conti-
 nuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," American Pblitical Science
 Review 63 (1969): 1083-1105.
 4. See Rosenstone et al., Third Parties in America.
 5. See Rosenstone et al., Third Parties in America.
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 cess.6 And finally, a high level of issue awareness among voters is cited as yet
 another factor that contributes to third-party success.7
 Much of the work on alternative candidate voting has focused on presidential
 elections and has examined factors such as levels of partisanship, alienation, issue
 satisfaction and awareness, economic discontent, and candidate satisfaction in the
 national electorate. There is some recent work, however, that has begun to focus
 on alternative candidate voting in sub-national elections. Endersby and Thomason
 study the 1990 election of U.S. Representative Bernard Sanders in Vermont and con-
 clude that his success was based upon the policy preferences of his supporters.'
 Reiter and Walsh study the elections of Governor James Longley of Maine in 1974,
 Governor Lowell Weicker of Connecticut in 1990, and also of Sanders in Vermont.
 Their basic finding is that state-specific and idiosyncratic factors-related to candi-
 date ideology and experience--explain the success of these particular candidates.9
 Donovan, Bowler and Terrio study support for third parties in California and find
 that factors such as voter dissatisfaction with major party candidates and percep-
 tions that the major parties are very similar help us understand why people vote for
 third parties. Their major finding, however, is that identification with a third party
 also predisposes voters to reject the major party candidates at election-time.'"
 What links many of these works is their focus on the relationship between voter
 attributes and third-party voting. Reiter and Walsh label this approach the "culture
 of independence." Although these authors reject the argument, the "culture of inde-
 pendence" approach holds that third-party candidates are more likely to succeed
 when voters possess attributes that lead them to vote for an alternative candidate.
 These attributes come in different shapes and forms, as I described above. But what
 links them is the notion that there is a common culture among voters that predis-
 poses them to support independent or third-party candidates.
 In this article, I expand and extend the analysis of alternative candidate voting to
 recent third-party gubernatorial successes in Maine and Minnesota. My purpose is
 to assess whether the factors that are cited as explanations for third-party voting in
 other settings are helpful in explaining the outcomes in these two states. I begin
 with some brief background on the elections of Angus King and Jesse Ventura
 6. See Rosenstone et al., Third Parties in America; and George A. Chressanthis and Stephen D. Shaf-
 fer, "Major Party Failure and Third-Party Voting in Presidential Elections, 1976-1988," Social Science Quar-
 terly 74 (1993): 265-273.
 7. See Rosenstone et al., Third Parties in America; and David J. Gillespie, Politics at the Periphery:
 Third Parties in Two-Party America (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1993).
 8. James W. Endersby and W. David Thomason, "Spotlight on Vermont: Third Party Success in the
 1990 Congressional Election," The Social Science Journal 31 (1994): 251-262.
 9. Howard L. Reiter and Julie M. Walsh, "Who Votes for Non-Major Party Candidates? The Cases of
 Longley, Sanders, and Weicker," Poblity 27 (1994): 651-663.
 10. Todd Donovan, Shaun Bowler, and Tammy Terrio, "Support for Third Parties in California," Ameri-
 can Pblitics Quarterly 28 (2000): 50-71.
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 268 THIRD-PARTY VOTING IN GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS
 before turning to an analysis of who voted for these alternative candidates and why.
 My findings suggest that a culture of independence is a necessary but insufficient
 precondition of third-party success. I argue that a fuller account of third-party suc-
 cess requires an analysis of the electoral context, and I conclude with some obser-
 vations about the role of money, registration rules, candidate reputation, and can-
 didate ideology in shaping third-party success in Maine and Minnesota.
 II. Background
 Maine
 Independent candidate Angus King was elected Governor of Maine in 1994, win-
 ning 35.8 percent of the vote and narrowly defeating his Democratic opponent,
 Joseph E. Brennan, a former two-term governor and member of the U.S. House of
 Representatives (Brennan captured 34 percent). The Republican candidate, Susan
 Collins, finished third, and won 23 percent of the vote, while another independent
 candidate, Jonathan Carter, captured 6.5 percent of the vote. Like many third-party
 and independent candidates elsewhere, King's campaign exploited anti-party senti-
 ment-his slogan was "partnership, not partisanship.""
 King's own background was in law, business and the media. Previously a Demo-
 crat, his only prior political experience had been as a Senate aide. He operated an
 energy conservation business that proved to be very profitable. And he was widely
 known across the state as the host of "Maine Watch," a public affairs interview pro-
 gram on Maine public television, a position he held for 18 years.
 King's campaign strategy was twofold. First, he went after the traditional parties.
 He derided the bitter competition between them and blamed a two-week shutdown
 of the state government in 1991 on partisan bickering. He concentrated his attacks
 on his Democratic rival, accusing Brennan of advocating stale ideas left over from his
 previous administration and deriding him as a "typical big-spending liberal hack."'2
 Second, King presented his own blend of fiscal conservatism and social liberalism-
 he called it "compassionate pragmatism."" He argued-reminiscent of Ross Perot-
 that his own background as a successful businessman provided him with the capac-
 ity for dealing with the state's big budget shortfall. He advocated school reform,
 including standardized tests and performance evaluation, and work for welfare
 recipients, though he never criticized the idea of public assistance.14 And finally, he
 vowed to create an environment that businesses would find more inviting.
 11. Sara Rimer, "Unfettered by Party, He's Set to Govern," New York Times, November 18, 1994: Al6.
 12. Associated Press, "Independent Elected Maine's Next Governor," Los Angeles Times, November 10,
 1994: A17.
 13. Rimer, "Unfettered by Party, He's Set to Govern."
 14. Brian McGrory, "Maine Pragmatist Set to Govern," Boston Globe, December 18, 1994: 37.
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 King ran as an independent but much of his campaign was directed toward
 attracting Republican voters. The Republican candidate, Susan Collins, never man-
 aged to portray herself as a serious contender. So the real battle was fought between
 Democrat and independent. King's candidacy had certain advantages that many
 alternative candidates do not enjoy. First, from his media days, he enjoyed statewide
 name recognition. Moreover, by most accounts, he was media-savvy and telegenic.
 Conversations with voters suggest that more than his major party rivals, King was
 viewed as trustworthy. Second, King had money. He was a self-made millionaire
 who spent $900,000 out of his own fortune on his campaign.15 Obviously, this
 allowed him to level the playing field in competition with the major party candi-
 dates. And third, Maine offers an environment that is hospitable to alternative can-
 didates. 37 percent of Mainers are registered independents.'6 The state elected an
 independent, James B. Longley, as Governor in 1974. And Ross Perot won 30 per-
 cent of the vote in Maine to finish second there in the 1992 presidential election, his
 best performance anywhere.
 In 1998, when King sought re-election, any disadvantages associated with being
 an independent were outweighed by the advantages conferred upon him by incum-
 bency. As the press put it, King by 1998 was a "relentlessly centrist incumbent who
 came through on first-term promises to balance an out-of-whack budget, stream-
 line state government, and raise school standards."" King coasted to victory, cap-
 turing almost 60 percent of the vote. His major party rivals were reduced to near
 third-party status: Republican James Longley, former member of the House of Rep-
 resentatives and son of the former independent Governor, captured 19 percent of
 the vote, while Democrat Thomas Connolly, won only 12 percent.'s Whereas King
 emphasized fiscal conservatism and targeted profligate Democratic spending in his
 initial run for the governorship, by 1998, he ran from the center, arguing that "both
 parties have to remind themselves that things happen in the middle of the ideolog-
 ical spectrum, not the extremes."'9
 Minnesota
 On October 23, 1998, only ten days before the Minnesota gubernatorial election,
 an article in the Minneapolis Star-Tribune described the conventional wisdom at
 that time-"no pundit, professor, or political pro believes Ventura can win."20 On
 15. McGrory, "Maine Pragmatist Set to Govern."
 16. Washington Post. "Sketches of New Governors," November 10, 1994: A38.
 17. Elizabeth Mehren, "Maine has a Role Model for Ventura," Los Angeles Times, November 26, 1998:
 A5.
 18. Tivo other independent candidates captured a combined 10.4 percent of the vote as well.
 19. Kenneth Chutchian, "Gov. King's Rivals Scrap for Support," Boston Globe, August 23, 1998: F15.
 20. Bob von Sternberg and Dane Smith, "Governor's Race Profile," Minneapolis Star Tribune, October
 23, 1998: IA.
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 November 3, Jesse Ventura turned the conventional wisdom on its head and cap-
 tured 37 percent of the vote in a heated three-way race to become Minnesota's first
 non-major party governor since 1938.21
 Ventura's previous career as a professional wrestler is well known but should
 not be diminished as it provided him with instant name recognition statewide, an
 asset for any third-party candidate. Ventura had also served as mayor of Brooklyn
 Park, the state's sixth largest city (population 60,000), as a talk-radio host, and
 appeared in several movies. These careers also enhanced his name recognition.
 Unlike many other alternative candidates, Ventura's campaign did not become
 associated with a burning issue that seized the electorate. Ventura certainly made
 his issue positions clear-he repeatedly described himself as a fiscal conservative
 and social liberal-but media accounts suggested that Ventura's growing appeal
 was predicated upon public disaffection from politics and from the political parties.
 His opponents were Republican candidate Norm Coleman, a former mayor of St.
 Paul who had switched from the Democrats (DFL); and state Attorney General
 Hubert Humphrey III, son of the legendary Minnesota Democrat Hubert Humphrey,
 but a name perhaps too well known in a time of outsider politics. In contrast to the
 major parties, Ventura promised to reject contributions from special interests. As
 one op-ed author wrote in the Minneapolis Star- Tribune, "the most damning factor
 against both candidates was their party affiliation. The GOP and DFL have ceased to
 be ideological platforms in the eyes of most voters. They have become conglomer-
 ates of small but powerful lobbies with deep pockets that seek to buy influence at
 all levels of government."22
 Why did Jesse Ventura pull off such a spectacular upset? Post-election analysts
 suggest that voters assessed Ventura's personal qualities and found them to be far
 more appealing than those of his major party opponents. These qualities included
 integrity and outsider status. But it is also important to emphasize other factors that
 enhanced Ventura's ability to compete. First, he was very well known. Second, Min-
 nesota provides public financing to gubernatorial candidates, and Ventura, as the
 Reform Party candidate, ended up receiving almost $500,000 in public funds, thus
 enabling him to mount a visible statewide campaign.23 Ventura also participated in
 21. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Farmer-Labor Party supplanted the Democrats as the other contending
 party in Minnesota elections. The Democrats regained major party status in 1944 when they merged with
 the Farmer-Labor Party. As a result, the Democrats in Minnesota are known as the Democratic-Farmer-Labor
 (DFL) Party. See Millard Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism: The Third Party Alternative (Minneapolis:
 University of Minnesota Press, 1979). And the Republican Party in Minnesota is officially called the Inde-
 pendent Republicans.
 22. Kenneth Nuckols, "Why We Voted for Jesse," Minneapolis Star Tribune, November 7, 1998: 19A.
 23. In the 1998 gubernatorial election, each of the three candidates received $310,282 from the general
 campaign fund (this money is split evenly among candidates whose parties have received at least 5 percent
 of the vote in previous elections). The candidates also receive an additional share of public funding that is
 determined by party preference check-offs on state tax forms. Here, Ventura, as the Reform candidate,
 received only $16,500 compared to $293,000 for Humphrey (DFL) and $249,000 for Coleman (Republican).
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 the gubernatorial debates and by most accounts, used his "plain-speaking, home-
 spun wisdom"24 to maximum advantage. Minnesota also has same-day voter regis-
 tration, enabling last-minute voters, who are disproportionately young and politically
 inexperienced, to vote. In fact, over 330,000 voters, or about 16 percent of the elec-
 torate, registered on election day.25 And about 60 percent of Minnesotans voted in the
 1998 election, a figure significantly higher than the 1998 national average of 36 per-
 cent. According to a Coleman campaign operative, 100,000 new voters voted in Min-
 nesota that day, with 80 percent of them supporting Ventura.26 Finally, Minnesota has
 a strong tradition of third-party politics. From the 1920s until the mid-1940s, Democ-
 ratic gubernatorial candidates ran a poor third behind Republicans and Farmer-
 Labor Party candidates. And in recent Senate elections in Minnesota, the Reform
 Party candidate has gathered between five and seven percent of the vote, thereby
 securing funding and a place on the ballot for future Reform party candidates.
 III. Multivariate Analysis of Third-Party Voting
 The various theories of third-party voting that I described at the outset specify
 conditions under which third-party candidates do well. These theories yield a series
 of hypotheses about the electorate. What the theories hold in common is the claim
 that voters who possess certain characteristics-alienation, anti-partisan sentiment,
 etc.-are more susceptible to the appeal of an alternative candidate.
 The Voter News Service (VNS) exit poll questions27 allow for the testing of the
 following hypotheses generated by theories of third party voting:
 * that previous support for a third-party candidate predisposes voters to support
 an alternative candidate;
 * that independents are more likely than major party identifiers to support an
 alternative candidate;
 * that young voters are more likely to support an alternative candidate;
 * that economic discontent predisposes voters to support an alternative candi-
 date;
 * that issue preferences predispose voters to support an alternative candidate.
 Finally, matching funds are also provided to candidates-Ventura qualified for $177,658, compared to
 $181,000 for Humprhey and $176,000 for Coleman. (Source: Minnesota Campaign Finance & Public Dis-
 closure Board, Minnesota Secretary of State, http://www.sos.state.mn.us.)
 24. Dane Smith and Robert Whereatt, "Ventura Wins," Minneapolis Star Tribune, November 4, 1998:
 1A.
 25. Minnesota Secretary of State. Internet site located at http://www.sos.state.mn.us.
 26. Brian Sweeney, "Insider's Account of the Coleman Campaign's Final Days," Minneapolis Star Tri-
 bune, November 15, 1998: 25A.
 27. The data throughout the article are from the VNS exit polls, 1994 and 1998. The data are distributed
 by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The analysis is of course limited by the
 scope of questions posed by VNS to voters as they left the voting booth.
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 To test these hypotheses, I constructed three multivariate models of third-party
 voting, one each for Maine in 1994, Maine in 1998, and Minnesota in 1998. Each model
 includes variables that allow for the testing of these hypotheses, as well as some addi-
 tional demographic control variables. These models are presented in Table 1.
 In each of the three elections, the dependent variable is respondent's vote
 choice.28 To estimate the effects of the explanatory variables, I constructed three
 multinomial logistic (MNL) models, one for each election.29 In all three years, voting
 Democrat or Republican is the response category and voting for the third-party can-
 didate is the reference (or excluded) category. As a result, positive coefficients in
 Table I represent an increased likelihood of a Democratic or Republican vote
 whereas negative coefficients denote a higher probability of supporting the third-
 party candidate. For ease of interpretation, I converted the models estimated in
 Table I into predicted probabilities of major party versus third-party support (see
 Table 2).30 The top row represents the probability of supporting the major party can-
 didate for a voter who is measured at the mode on every independent variable in
 the model. Subsequent rows display the probability of supporting the major party
 candidate for a respondent who is.measured at the mode on every independent
 variable except the one indicated in the first column.
 Angus King in Maine
 The multivariate analysis in Table 1 points to several key findings. First, in the
 1994 race between Democrat Brennan and independent King, Republican identi-
 fiers, Bush supporters (from 1992), conservatives, and well-educated respondents
 were all significantly more likely to support the independent candidate.31 To some
 28. In all three years, the dependent variable is trichotomous, with I = vote for the Democratic candi-
 date, 2 = vote for Republican candidate, and 3 = vote for the third-party candidate (King or Ventura). The
 coding scheme for all the variables is described in the Appendix.
 29. Multinomial logistic regression is an appropriate technique when the dependent variable is a nom-
 inal variable with more than two categories. See John H. Aldrich and Forrest D. Nelson, Linear Probability,
 Logit, and Probit Models (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1984); and Anthony J. Nownes, "Primary, General
 Elections, and Voter Turnout: A Multinomial Logit Model of the Decision to Vote," American Politics Quar-
 terly 20 (1992): 205-226. The model produces two sets of estimates for each election: the effect of the inde-
 pendent variables on the odds of supporting the Democrat over the third-party candidate, and the effect of
 the independent variables on the odds of supporting the Republican over the third-party candidate.
 30. In MNL, the effect of the coefficients on the probability of third party voting depends not only on the
 value of the coefficient but also on the value assumed by the independent variable. To estimate the proba-
 bility of third-party voting using the MNL coefficients displayed in Table 1, I first substituted the modal value
 of each variable into the MNL model. I then changed one or two variables at a time to illustrate the impact
 of that change on the probability of third-party voting for a voter who was otherwise measured at the mode.
 These probabilities are shown in Table 2. See Raymond E. Wright, "Logistic Regression," in Reading and
 Understanding Multivariate Statistics, ed. Laurence G. Grimm and Paul R. Yarnold (Washington, DC: Amer-
 ican Psychological Association, 1995).
 31. Previous presidential vote choice, party identification, and ideology are all nominal variables with
 multiple categories. In constructing these dummy variables, I excluded Clinton voters, Democratic identi-
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 extent, King's appeal mirrored that of a Republican candidate. In fact, given the
 weakness of Republican candidate Susan Collins, it is not far-fetched to suggest that
 although King ran as an independent, the 1994 gubernatorial election in Maine had
 the look of a traditional Republican-Democratic race.
 But beyond King's appeal to traditional Republican constituencies, two other fac-
 tors stand out. All other things being equal, Perot voters were significantly more likely
 to support King than either Brennan or Collins. The figures in Table 2 suggest that the
 modal voter32 had a 60 percent chance of supporting Brennan over King whereas a
 Perot supporter who otherwise measured at the mode had only a 31 percent chance
 of supporting Brennan over King. Similarly, being an independent was significantly
 related to support for King over his Democratic rival-Democratic identifiers were 23
 percentage points more likely than independents to support Brennan over King (see
 Table 2). It is clear from these figures that when controlling for all other explanations,
 having previously supported a third-party candidate and identifying as an independ-
 ent were important explanations for Angus King's initial success.
 Other traditional explanations for third-party success are less convincing in the
 context of this Maine election. Voters whose financial situation worsened were no
 more likely to support King. Being young (and therefore politically inexperienced)
 was not a significant predictor of support for the independent candidate (nor was
 gender, race, or income). And finally, self-described moderate voters were no more
 likely than liberals or conservatives to respond to King's centrist appeal.
 By 1998, when Governor King coasted to reelection, his principal opponent was
 now a Republican (Longley) and King, running as a centrist, demonstrated across-
 the-board strength. Only three factors produced significant increases in the proba-
 bility of a Republican vote: support for Dole, identification as a conservative, and
 support for Perot.33 On the Democratic side, independents, Republicans, moder-
 ates, and women were all more likely to support King than his Democratic rival
 (Connolly) but an examination of the probabilities associated with these categories
 (see Table 2) suggests that these effects were not especially strong. In addition, sup-
 port for Perot was not a significant predictor of support for King over Connolly. As
 in 1994, being young or economically worse off made no difference in the choice
 that voters made. I argued earlier that King's primary persona in 1998 was incum-
 bent, not alternative candidate. His across-the-board support would lead us to
 fiers, and liberals. As a result, the coefficients on " Perot voter" and "Republican voter" represent the effect
 of these variables in comparison to Clinton voters (excluded category). The coefficients on "Independent
 ID" and "Republican ID" represent the effect of these variables in comparison to Democratic identifiers
 (excluded category). And the coefficients on "Moderate" and "Conservative" represent the effect of these
 variables in comparison to Liberals (excluded category).
 32. See notes at the bottom of Table 2 for a description of the modal voter in each of these elections.
 33. Support for Clinton is the excluded category in this series of dummy variables (see note 31). There-
 fore, the coefficient on the Perot voter variable represents the difference between a Perot voter and a Clin-
 ton voter. As expected, Perot voters were more likely than Clinton voters to support Longley over King.
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 Table 1
 Multinomial Logit Model of Third-Party Voting
 (entries are logit coefficients, standard errors in parentheses)
 Maine 1994 Maine 1998 Minnesota 1998
 Brennan (D) Collins (R) Connolly (D) Longley (R) Humphrey (D) Coleman (R)
 Independent Variables v. King v. King v. King v. King v. Ventura v. Ventura
 CONSTANT 3.83* 1.57 -0.04 -4.01* 0.05 -3.45*
 (1.24) (1.28) (1.53) (.26) (.78) (.91)
 INCOME 0.01 -0.0006 0.001 -0.003 -0.13 0.15
 (.08) (.08) (. 11) (.09) (.08) (.08)
 OLDER VOTER 0.16 0.001 -0.67 0.48 0.89* -0.26
 (.26) (.25) (.43) (.47) (.30) (.26)
 FEMALE VOTER -0.25 -0.01 -0.79* -0.003 0.24 -0.004
 (.17) (.17) (.28) (.23) (.19) (.19)
 WHITE VOTER -1.41 -1.84 0.001 0.22 -0.01 .31
 (1.11) (1.15) (1.37) (.92) (.55) (.63)
 EDUCATION -0.26* -0.19* 0.29* .28*
 (.08) (.08) (.09) (.09)
 ECONOMIC DISCONTENT 0.01 -0.10 0.18 0.16 -0.001 .004
 (.12) (.12) (.21) (.17) (.15) (.15)
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 Table 1 (continued)
 Maine 1994 Maine 1998 Minnesota 1998
 Brennan (D) Collins (R) Connolly (D) Longley (R) Humphrey (D) Coleman (R)
 Independent Variables v. King v. King v. King v. King v. Ventura v. Ventura
 GUN CONTROL -1.22* -0.83*
 (.33) (.23)
 PEROT VOTER -1.23* -0.55* -1.13 1.37* -1.63* -1.34*
 (.22) (.25) (.60) (.36) (.39) (.38)
 REPUBLICAN VOTER -0.86* 0.15 -0.34 1.55* -0.97* 1.28*
 (.25) (.25) (.49) (.33) (.35) (.24)
 INDEPENDENT ID -1.14* 0.17 -0.92* 0.002 -1.45* 0.38
 (.20) (.26) (.32) (.36) (.23) (.26)
 REPUBLICAN ID -1.56* 0.46 -1.24* 0.77 -1.46* 0.88*
 (.27) (.28) (.56) (.40) (.35) (.30)
 MODERATE -0.31 0.43 -0.68* 0.68 0.25 1.31*
 (.21) (.29) (.32) (.52) (.22) (.33)
 CONSERVATIVE -0.64* 0.63* -0.37 1.23* 0.34 1.86*
 (.26) (.31) (.41) (.53) (.31) (.36)
 * p < .05, significant coefficients in bold.
 Aldrich-Nelson pseudo-R2: 0.24 0.22 0.40
 Percentage of cases correctly predicted: 55.4 69.4 65.5
 Sample size: 995 609 1,021
 -4
 ?..r
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 Table 2
 Effect of Key Variables on Probability of Third-Party Voting
 (entries are probability of voting for major party candidate v. third-party candidate)
 Maine 1994 Maine 1998 Minnesota 1998
 Brennan (D) Collins (R) Connolly (D) Longley (R) Humphrey (D) Coleman (R)
 v. King v. King v. King v. King v. Ventura v. Ventura
 Modal voter .60 .43 .14 .09 .77 .30
 Perot voter .31 .31 .05 .28 .39 .10
 Clinton voter .60 .43 .14 .09 .77 .30
 Bush (92) or Dole (96) voter .39 .47 .10 .32 .56 .61
 Independent ID .60 .43 .06 .09 .43 .39
 Democratic ID .83 .39 .14 .09 .77 .30
 Republican ID .50 .51 .05 .17 .43 .51
 Perot voter + Independent ID .31 .31 .02 .28 .13 .14
 Moderate .60 .43 .14 .09 .77 .30
 Liberal .67 .33 .24 .10 .72 .12
 Conservative .52 .49 .18 .15 .78 .43
 Low education .66 .48 * * .58 .16
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 Table 2 (continued)
 Maine 1994 Maine 1998 Minnesota 1998
 Brennan (D) Collins (R) Connolly (D) Longley (R) Humphrey (D) Coleman (R)
 Independent Variables v. King v. King v. King v. King v. Ventura v. Ventura
 Male .66 .44 .26 .09 .77 .30
 Female .60 .43 .14 .09 .81 .30
 Under 30 years old .56 .44 .24 .06 .57 .36
 30 plus years old .60 .43 .14 .09 .77 .30
 Excellent state economy * * * * .83 .34
 Poor state economy * * * * .61 .24
 Opposed to gun control * * * * .49 .19
 Supports gun control * * * * .77 .30
 a In Maine 1994, the modal voter had the following characteristics: female, white, over 30, income between $30,000 and $49,999, high school graduate, financial situation
 stayed the same, voted for Clinton in 1992, identified as an Independent, and self-described moderate.
 b In Maine 1998, the modal voter had the following characteristics: female, white, over 30, income between $30,000 and $49,999, financial situation stayed the same, voted
 for Clinton in 1996, identified as a Democrat, and self-described moderate.
 c In Minnesota 1998, the modal voter had the following characteristics: male, white, over 30, income between $30,000 and $49,999, college graduate, financial situation stayed
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 278 THIRD-PARTY VOTING IN GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS
 expect many of these variables to be weak or insignificant-as indeed they are. In
 short, the 1998 findings displayed in Table I tell the story not of an alternative can-
 didate trying to assemble a coalition of anti-partisan and disaffected voters but
 rather of a popular incumbent attracting votes from all segments of his electorate.
 Jesse Ventura in Minnesota
 Jesse Ventura ran against the political parties and against the establishment
 when he sought the governorship of Minnesota. To what extent did this more tradi-
 tional third-party campaign win over voters whose qualities make them susceptible
 to an outsider's appeal?
 Several factors account for Ventura's success. According to the VNS exit polls,
 fully 76 percent of Perot voters cast a ballot for Ventura. The findings in Table I
 reveal that even after controlling for other explanations, prior support for Perot
 exerted a strong and significant effect on support for Ventura over both of his major
 party rivals. Although Perot did not campaign for Ventura-indeed he remained
 silent with respect to Ventura's candidacy-Ventura did run under the banner of the
 Reform party, the party that Perot founded. To the extent that a loyal core of Reform
 voters existed in Minnesota, Ventura was highly successful in wooing their support.
 Partisanship also played an important role. In the choice between Ventura and
 Republican Coleman, partisanship operated in a predictable fashion-Republican
 identifiers were more likely than Democratic identifiers to support Coleman over
 Ventura, and there were no differences between independents and Democrats. On
 the Democratic side however, both Republicans and independents were more likely
 than Democrats to support Ventura over Humphrey. There is, moreover, a very
 strong joint effect of independence and prior support for Perot (see Table 2). The
 modal voter had a .77 probability of supporting Humphrey over Ventura and a .30
 probability of supporting Coleman over Ventura. Among independents who sup-
 ported Perot, these probabilities drop sharply to .13 and .14, respectively.
 There are other noteworthy patterns in Tables I and 2. At least one issue appears to
 have played a role--opponents of gun control were more likely to support Ventura over
 either of his opponents. Ventura's appeal over Humphrey also resonated among those
 under the age of 30 and among those who felt that the state economy was in poor con-
 dition. And the least educated were more likely than the most educated to support the
 third-party candidate. These particular effects-youth, economic anxiety, opposition to
 gun control, as well as independence and a previous vote for Perot-confirm the por-
 trait of Ventura as a populist third-party candidate who mobilized disaffected voters.
 IV. Observations and Conclusions
 Why do third-party candidates do well in some elections and poorly in others?
 There are at least two approaches one might take to answer this question. The first
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 approach---<haracterized by the theories of third-party voting presented at the
 outset--directs us to examine the characteristics of voters themselves. When voter
 cynicism or economic discontent runs high, when dissatisfaction with the major
 parties or their candidates rises, or when voters are young or politically inexperi-
 enced-they are more likely to support third-party candidates. The second
 approach focuses on the context in which the election is fought. Can a third-party
 candidate mobilize new voters by means of relaxed registration rules? Can the alter-
 native candidate draw on financial resources on or near par with the major party
 candidates? Does the third-party candidate enjoy an established reputation and
 wide name recognition? When a third-party candidate is well known and can take
 advantage of deep coffers, then that candidate is likely to do well, at least by tradi-
 tional third-party standards.
 The case of Ross Perot in 1992 illustrates the importance of electoral context.
 Rosenstone et al. report that when applied to the 1992 presidential election, their
 otherwise accurate model of third-party voting predicted that only six percent of the
 electorate would defect from the major parties.4 In fact, nearly 20 percent of voters
 cast a ballot for a minor party candidate, and Perot alone won 18.9 percent. Why
 was their model so wide off the mark in 1992? An electoral context exceptionally
 favorable to a third-party candidate accounts for the difference. Perot's deep pock-
 ets, the media attention lavished upon him, and his presence alongside President
 Bush and Governor Clinton in the televised debates propelled him to a prominence
 that most third-party candidates never achieve. In particular, Perot's ability to spend
 was a crucial factor in explaining his success relative to other third-party candidates.
 Rosenstone et al. forecast that had Perot's expenditures equaled John Anderson's
 1980 expenditures (relative to what the major parties spent), Perot's vote would
 have dropped by nearly six percentage points.
 The analysis presented here provides some evidence to support the notion that
 certain voters are indeed more likely to support a third-party candidate. Two factors
 in particular emerge as powerful predictors of third-party support. First, the pres-
 ence of a large bloc of independents proved to be a significant explanation for the
 success of these alternative candidates. Although neither state contained an unusu-
 ally high proportion of self-described independents,35 it is true that independents
 were still more likely to support the alternative candidate, and when controlling for
 all other factors, by substantial margins. This finding confirms other research con-
 ducted at the presidential level.36 The presence of a large bloc of independents (or
 34. Rosenstone et al., Third Parties in America, 259.
 35. According to the VNS exit polls, 29.6 percent of 1994 Maine voters were independent compared to
 35.5 percent of voters nationally. In 1998, 27.8 percent of Maine voters and 26.2 percent of Minnesota voters
 called themselves independent. The national figure in 1998 was 24.3 percent.
 36. See, for example, Rosenstone et al., Third Parties in America; Gold, "Third Party Voting in Presi-
 dential Elections"; and Martin P. Wattenberg, The Decline of American Political Parties, 1952-1996 (Cam-
 bridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
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 voters with weak attachments to the established parties) is a precondition of third-
 party success.
 A second explanation was significant in both Maine elections and in the Min-
 nesota case: voters who have demonstrated a previous relationship with a third
 party are more likely to cast a ballot for subsequent third-party candidates. Dono-
 van, Bowler and Terrio found that voters who identify with a third party are more
 likely to support third parties in a variety of statewide elections.37 Similarly, prior
 support for Ross Perot was strongly correlated with support for Angus King and
 Jesse Ventura. Ross Perot ran very well in Maine and Minnesota, both in 1992 and
 in 1996, and many voters in these states had already cast a ballot for him." Evi-
 dently, a prior vote for a third-party candidate presages a future vote for a third-party
 candidate, and these voters-who at least twice supported alternative candidates-
 may indeed constitute a bloc that third parties can mobilize.
 The strong effect of independence and prior support for a third-party candidate
 suggests that growing partisan instability in the electorate has paved the way for third-
 party breakthroughs. In 1960, The American Voter argued that voters held long-term
 psychological attachments to the parties and these attachments shaped the vote
 choice. Subsequent work offered a more fleeting conception of partisanship, one
 rooted in retrospective assessments of party performance-but still posited a strong
 relationship between party identification and electoral support for one of the major
 parties. By the 1980s, Wattenberg and others provided much evidence of party
 decomposition in the electorate."9 One consequence of this growing partisan insta-
 bility has been the success, in the 1990s, of these alternative gubernatorial candi-
 dates-alongside the success of other third-party candidates. Increasing numbers of
 voters have been willing to break the partisan mold and cast a ballot for a minor party
 candidate. Indeed, as more voters undergo the experience of actually voting for a
 third-party candidate, they become more likely to do so again in the future. Thus par-
 tisan instability and partisan decline have become the lifeblood of third-party success.
 But beyond the effect of being independent and having voted for Perot, the
 Maine and Minnesota cases hold little in common. Economic anxiety played no role
 in Maine but perception of the statewide economy was a significant predictor of the
 vote in Minnesota.40 Similarly, age had no effect in Maine but was an important
 37. Donovan, Bowler, and Terrio, "Support for Third Parties in California."
 38. In 1992, when Perot won 19 percent of the national vote, Maine was his strongest state; he captured
 30 percent of the vote. In Minnesota that year, he won 24 percent of the vote. In 1996, Maine was again his
 strongest state. He won 14 percent of the vote in Maine, 12 percent in Minnesota, and 8 percent nationally.
 39. See Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The American
 Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960); Morris P Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (New
 Haven: Yale University Press, 1981); Wattenberg, The Decline of American Political Parties; and Leon D.
 Epstein, Political Parties in the American Mold (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986).
 40. In the VNS exit polls, Maine and Minnesota voters were asked about their own economic situation.
 But only Minnesota voters were asked to assess the statewide economy.
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 factor in Minnesota. In fact, the data analysis suggests the Minnesota election comes
 closer to the more familiar model of a third-party candidate who runs against the
 establishment and who mobilizes disaffected voters-young, anti-partisan, con-
 cerned about the state economy, and in this particular case, opponents of gun con-
 trol as well.
 Certain features of the electoral context, however, bind the two cases under study
 and suggest that one must look beyond the electorate for a fuller explanation of third-
 party success. After all, the number of independents has grown nation-wide; yet in
 most states third-party candidates continue to be marginalized. Four factors link the
 Maine and Minnesota cases. First, both King and Ventura enjoyed statewide name
 recognition alongside reputations for personal integrity. As Rosenstone, Behr, and
 Lazarus argue in the context of presidential elections, "nationally prestigious" candi-
 dates enjoy significant advantages over ones that are not well known.41 It is worth
 pointing out that the two other alternative candidates elected Governor in the
 1990s--Walter Hickel in Alaska and Lowell Weicker in Connecticut-were also well
 known figures with established political reputations in their states. Second, both King
 and Ventura ran as fiscal conservatives and social liberals-an ideological profile that
 distinguishes them from the major parties and appears to hold some appeal for
 voters. Third, elections in both states are conducted in an environment conducive to
 third-party success. Both states allow election-day voter registration, thus enabling
 alternative candidates to more easily mobilize new voters who often constitute a sig-
 nificant part of their coalition. And both candidates were able to spend significant
 sums of money-Ventura from the state's generous public financing program and
 King from his personal fortune-that enabled them to compete against the major
 parties on a level playing field.42 Fourth, both Maine and Minnesota are states with
 established traditions of third-party voting, traditions that create an environment
 more hospitable to alternative candidates.
 The victories of Angus King in Maine and Jesse Ventura in Minnesota, alongside
 other third-party successes in recent years, point to a slow but creeping public will-
 ingness to at least consider alternative candidates. A series of surveys in the 1990s
 suggest that Americans have little confidence in the two-party system and believe
 that a viable third-party alternative would improve the quality of the nation's politi-
 cal life.43 Moreover, the success of these candidates, especially Ventura, was predi-
 cated upon the removal of obstacles that consistently stand in the way of third par-
 ties, both in gubernatorial and in presidential elections-financing, access to media
 and to debates, and ability to mobilize disaffected voters, especially late in the cam-
 41. Rosenstone et al., Third Parties in America.
 42. Maine recently adopted the Maine Clean Election Act to provide public financing to candidates run-
 ning for state office, beginning in 2000.
 43. Christian Collet, "Third Parties and the Iwo-Party System," Public Opinion Quarterly 60 (1996): 431-
 450.
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 paign. The analysis of the gubernatorial elections in Maine and Minnesota suggests
 that the success of third-party candidates depends not only upon voters who are
 favorably disposed to the appeal of such a candidate but also upon an electoral con-
 text that gives these candidates a fighting chance.
 APPENDIX
 Coding of Variables in Multinomial Logit Models
 Dependent variable
 Vote choice: 1 = Democratic candidate; 2 = Republican candidate; 3 = Angus
 King (Maine) or Jesse Ventura (Minnesota).
 Independent variables
 Income: Six-point scale where 1 = less than $15,000; 2 = $15,000-$29,999; 3 =
 $30,000-$49,999; 4 = $50,000-$74,999; 5 = $75,000-$99,999; 6 = $100,000 or more.
 Older voter: 0 = less than 30 years; I = 30 years or older.
 Female Voter: 0 = male; I = female.
 White voter: 0 = non-white; I = white.
 Education: 1 = no high school; 2 = high school graduate; 3 = some college;
 4 = college graduate; 5 = post-graduate.
 Economic discontent: Financial situation is 1 = better; 2 = same; 3 = worse.
 State economy: I = excellent; 2 = good; 3 = not so good; 4 = poor.
 Gun control: 0 = supports gun control; I = opposes gun control.
 Perot voter: 0 = voted Democrat or Republican in previous presidential elec-
 tion; I = voted for Perot in previous presidential election.
 Republican voter: 0 = voted Perot or Democrat in previous presidential elec-
 tion; I = voted Republican in previous presidential election.
 Independent ID: 0 = identifies with major party; I = identifies as independent.
 Republican ID: 0 = identifies as independent or Democrat; I = identifies as
 Republican.
 Moderate: 0 = identifies as liberal or conservative; 1 = identifies as moderate.
 Conservative: 0 = identifies as liberal or moderate; 1 = identifies as conservative.
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